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Selected Tort and Civil Justice Issues Before the
117th Ohio General Assembly
STANTON G. DARLING II*
During 1986, some forty-three states adopted measures designed to increase the
availability and affordability of liability insurance.' Nearly half of those states made
what can fairly be described as major changes in tort or civil justice law.
The 116th Ohio General Assembly enacted several measures relating to the
availability and affordability of liability insurance during 1986.2 Amended Sub. S.B.
330, a comprehensive measure combining intreased regulation of and disclosure by
liability insurers and changes in tort and civil justice law, was, however, vetoed by
Governor Richard F. Celeste on December 19, 1986.
The 117th Ohio General Assembly continued to work toward a comprehensive
insurance regulation/tort and civil justice bill. At the time of this writing, the House
of Representatives had passed Sub. H.B. 1, virtually identical to Am. Sub. S.B. 330,
except that most of the provisions dealing specifically with product liability law had
been removed. The House had also passed Sub. H.B. 235, a modified version of the
product liability provisions previously included in Am. Sub. S.B. 330. Both Sub. H.B.
I and Sub. H.B. 235 were being considered by a select committee of the Ohio Senate.
This Article reviews the major tort and civil justice issues considered by the
General Assembly during the early months of 1987 and summarizes the major
changes which would be made by Sub. H.B. I and Sub. H.B. 235, the two bills
approved by the Ohio House of Representatives.
I. THE LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
A. 1986: Am. Sub. S.B. 330 Enacted and Vetoed
1. Senate Action
In February 1986, various Senators introduced Senate Bills 329 through 339,3
which proposed far-reaching changes 4 in various areas of tort and civil justice law.
* Stanton G. Darling 11 is a Professor at Capital University Law School. During 1986, he served as Special
Counsel to the Select Committee to Study the Civil Justice System of the Ohio House of Representatives. During early
1987, he served as an advisor on tort and civil justice matters to the Office of the Speaker of the Ohio House of
Representatives.
1. According to a summary prepared by the National Conference of State Legislatures, only seven states
(Arkansas, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Texas, and Virginia) failed to report the enactment during 1986
of any legislation designed to increase the availability and affordability of liability insurance. 1986 State Legislative
Action: Liability Insurance (Jan. 7, 1987) (unpublished report on file with the Ohio State Law Journal). The Oregon
Legislative Assembly, id. at 31, and the Texas Legislature, id. at 35, were not in session during 1986.
2. Oiuo Rev. Coos ANNs. §§ 2305.232, 2305.38, 2744.081, 3937.18(I) (Baldwin Supp. 1986).
3. Senate Bills 329 through 338 were introduced February 19, 1986. Oio SENATE JoumAL 1166-67 (Feb. 19,
1986). Senate Bill 339 was introduced February 25, 1986. Id. at 1177 (Feb. 25, 1986). Senate Bill 330 was re-referred
to the Senate Committee on Financial Institutions and Insurance, id. at 1313 (Mar. 25, 1986), and then to the Senate
Committee on Rules, id. at 1339 (Mar. 26, 1986).
4. The 11 Senate bills (several in amended form) are summarized at 59 Omo ST. BAR Ass'N REvr. 688 (May 5,
1986). The Council of Delegates of the Ohio State Bar Association, at a special meeting on May 31, 1986, voted to
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The eleven bills were referred to the Senate Economic Development and Small
Business Committee,5 which held hearings and eventually reported all of them in one
form or another. 6 Three of the eleven bills were passed by the Senate on March 27,
1986;7 one was defeated on the Senate floor.8 The other seven were not voted on by
the full Senate.
2. House Action
Companion versions of nine of the eleven Senate bills were introduced in the
House, 9 as well as several other tort and civil justice measures. 10 The House billsII
and the three measures passed by the Senate' 2 were referred to the House Select
Committee to Study the Civil Justice System. The Select Committee held extensive
hearings and reported an omnibus tort and civil justice bill as Sub. S.B. 330 on August
27, 1986.13
On September 2, 1986, the House Insurance Committee reported Sub. H.B.
876, providing for increased regulation of and disclosure by the liability insurance
industry. 14 Substitute S.B. 330 and Sub. H.B. 876 were combined in the House Rules
Committee; the new Sub. S.B. 330 passed the House of Representatives on
September 4, 1986, by a vote of eighty-seven to eight. t5
3. Conference Committee
A joint conference committee on Sub. S.B. 330 was appointed and ultimately
reported Am. Sub. S.B. 330 on November 21, 1986. On that date, the House agreed
to the conference committee report by a vote of seventy-eight to seventeen,' 6 but the
Senate vote was fifteen to fifteen. 17 The joint conference committee was reconvened
and made several changes in the bill. The second conference committee report was
support only one of the 11 bills (S.B. 336, which would have admitted evidence of nonuse of seat belts in auto
crashworthiness cases) in its original form. Id. at 1008-1 (June 23, 1986). The Council voted to oppose eight of the bills
and to support the remaining two in their amended forms. Id.
5. Otio SENATE JoutNAL 1170-71, 1178 (Feb. 25, 1986).
6. Four bills (Am. S.B. 330, SuB. S.B. 332, AM. S.B. 336, and Sun. S.B. 337) were reported March 19, 1986.
Id. at 1281-82 (Mar. 19, 1986). The other seven (Am. S.B. 329, AM. S.B. 331, Sun. S.B. 333, Sun. S.B. 334, SuB. S.B.
335, SuB. S.B. 338 and S.B. 339) were reported May 14, 1986. Id. at 1444-46 (May 14, 1986).
7. The three bills were AM. S.B. 330, id. at 1395 (Mar. 27, 1986), AM. Sun. S.B. 332, id. at 1385, and At. S.B.
336, id. at 1397.
8. SuB. S.B. 337 was defeated. Id. at 1397.
9. House Bills 881 through 883 and 888 through 890 were introduced March 6, 1986. Owo HousE JoutvAL
1483-84 (Mar. 6, 1986). House Bills 895 through 897 were introduced March 11, 1986. Id. at 1538 (Mar. 11, 1936).
10. For example, H.B. 805, id. at 1259 (Jan. 22, 1986); H.B. 879, id. at 1468 (Mar. 5, 1986); H.J. REs. 42, id.
at 1500 (Mar. 11, 1986).
11. Id. at 1537-38, 1540 (Mar. 18, 1986).
12. Id. at 1716 (May 13, 1986).
13. Id. at 1941 (Aug. 27, 1986).
14. Id. at 1942 (Sept. 2, 1986).
15. Id. at 1945 (Sept. 4, 1986).
16. Id. at 2196 (Nov. 21, 1986).
17. OHIo SENATE JouRAL 2005 (Nov. 21, 1986).
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agreed to in the late evening of November 21, 1986, by a House vote of sixty-nine
to sixteent 8 and by a Senate vote of twenty to ten. 19
4. The Veto
On December 19, 1986, Governor Celeste vetoed Am. Sub. S.B. 330. He stated
that the product liability provisions of the bill were "unacceptable" and that, were
the General Assembly to "pass the same bill without the product liability section[,]
I would sign such a measure the day it reached my desk.' '20
On December 23, 1986, the Senate voted nineteen to twelve to override the veto
of Am. Sub. S.B. 330,21 thereby falling one vote short of the twenty votes22 required
to override.
B. Action in Early 1987
1. Senate Action
On January 6, 1987, S.B. 11, virtually identical to the vetoed Am. Sub. S.B.
330, was introduced.23 On February 25, 1987, S.B. 102, a new product liability
measure, was introduced. 24 The bills were referred to the Senate Select Committee on
Tort Reform on March 4, 1987.25
2. House Action
On January 14, 1987, H.B. 1, virtually identical to the vetoed Am. Sub. S.B.
330, was introduced. 26 It was referred to the House Committee on Insurance, 27 which
held hearings and reported Sub. H.B. 1 on February 17, 1987.28 The substitute bill
retained the insurance and civil justice provisions of Am. Sub. S.B. 330 with minor
clarifying and technical changes, but did not include most of the product liability
provisions of the vetoed bill. The House of Representatives passed Sub. H.B. 1 on
February 17, 1987, by a vote of eighty-two to twelve. 29
The product liability provisions of Am. Sub. S.B. 330, with significant
modifications, were introduced as H.B. 235 on February 17, 1987.30 House Bill 235
was referred to the House Committee on Civil and Commercial Law, 31 which held
18. OHIo HousE JOURNAL 2383 (Nov. 21, 1986).
19. OHIo SENAT JOURNAL 2058 (Nov. 21, 1986).
20. Statement of Reason for Veto of Amended Substitute Senate Bill 330 (Dec. 19, 1986) (copy on file with the
Ohio State Law Journal).
21. OnIo SE ATE JoUrNAL 2177 (Dec. 23, 1986).
22. OHIo Co.Sr. art. II, § 16 (Baldwin 1979).
23. OHIO SENATE JOURNAL 10-11 (Jan. 6, 1987).
24. Id. at 119 (Feb. 25, 1987).
25. Id. at 127, 128 (Mar. 4, 1987).
26. OHIO HousE JoUsNA 56-57 (Jan. 14, 1987).
27. Id. at 73 (Jan. 21, 1987).
28. Id. at 142 (Feb. 17, 1987).
29. Id. at 142-43.
30. Id. at 152.
31. Id. at 157.
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additional hearings. On March 26, 1987, the Committee reported Sub. H.B. 235,32
which passed the House of Representatives by a vote of eighty-nine to eight on April
1, 1987. 33
I. MODIFYING TRADITIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES
AWARDS IN TORT ACTIONS
Four traditional characteristics of tort compensatory damages awards have come
under increased scrutiny in recent years. The typical award has been made in a lump
sum, has been potentially unlimited in size,34 and has been made without deducting
so-called collateral benefits which may compensate an injured plaintiff for part of the
loss caused by the defendant(s). In addition, if two or more defendants are held
responsible for the same injury, their legal liability has been joint and several.
A. Periodic Payment of Future Damages
The traditional tort award compensates a plaintiff in a lump sum for all harm-
past, present, and future-legally caused by the tort in question. 35 In a tort action
alleging serious physical injury, the trier of fact may have to determine what the
plaintiff's medical needs will be ten or twenty years hence, how much it will cost to
meet those needs, and what amount in present dollars is required to meet those needs.
As one commentator has phrased it,
assessing future losses calls for speculation about events that the flux of time will render
certain, such as ups and downs in the victim's physical condition, when he will eventually
die, whether his widow will remarry, and so forth.
As to these we are therefore invited, nay compelled, to predict-more bluntly: to
guess.
36
In 1980, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
approved a Model Periodic Payment of Judgments Act.37 The Act, which permits
either party to opt for periodic payment if future damages exceed a specified dollar
amount, has generated strong opinions, both pro and con. 38 During 1986, at least nine
other states enacted some type of statute providing for periodic payment of future
damages in tort actions. 39
32. Id. at 309 (Mar. 26, 1987).
33. Id. at 324-25 (Apr. 1, 1987).
34. Although some eight states adopted compensatory damages "caps" of some sort during 19S6, e.g., FLA. STAT.
AN. § 768.80 (West Supp. 1987) ($450,000 cap on noneconomic damages), MuN. STAT. ANN. § 549.23 (West Supp.
1987) ($400,000 cap on intangible losses per person), neither the Ohio House nor the Ohio Senate has appeared in recent
months to contemplate such a change for tort actions generally.
35. RESrATEENr (SEcoND) OF ToRrs §§ 910, 912 (1977).
36. Fleming, Damages: Capital or Rent?, 19 U. ToRoro L.J. 295, 302 (1969).
37. HANDBOOK NAT'L CONF. COMI'RS ON UNr-oPi ST. LAws & PROc. ANN. CONF. 55 (1982). The Act is set out at 14
U.L.A. (Supp. 1987 at 22).
38. Compare Henderson, Periodic Payments of Bodily Injury Awards, 66 A.B.A. J. 734 (1980) with Corboy,
Structured Injustice: Compulsory Periodic Payment of Judgments, id. at 1524.
39. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.17.040 (Supp. 1986); Act of June 5, 1986, No. 86-338, § 2, 1986 Conn. Legis. Serv. No.
5 at 400 (West); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 768.77-.78 (West Supp. 1987); Act of May 23, 1986, § 39, 1986 Iowa Legis. Serv.
No. 8 at 33 (West) (amending IOWA COD § 668.3); MD. Cis. & JUo. PROC. CODE § 11-109 (Supp. 1986); Act of July 6,
1986, No. 178, §§ 6305-07, 6309, 6311, 1986 Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 4 at 222 (Vest) (to be codified at MicH. Corv.
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Under Sub. H.B. 1,40 if future damages exclusive of future wage or salary loss
exceed both $200,000 and twenty-five percent of the total damages awarded in a
personal injury action, either party may request that the court order the excess amount
to be paid in periodic payments rather than in a lump sum. The court must hold a
hearing and consider specified statutory criteria before ordering periodic payments. If
periodic payments are ordered and if the plaintiff dies before receiving all the pay-
ments, any payments for future medical expenses and for future pain and suffering
terminate. The court retains continuing jurisdiction over any judgment which includes
periodic payments.
B. Modifying the Collateral Source Rule
If a tort victim receives, from a source other than an apparent tortfeasor, benefits
which reduce his or her net loss, the tortfeasor is not given credit for those benefits.
Under the collateral source rule,4 the victim is permitted to retain such "collateral"
benefits. Often, of course, the source of a collateral benefit will be subrogated pro
tanto to the victim's rights against the tortfeasor.42 The collateral source rule has been
criticized as "probably expensive because it compensates the plaintiff more than once
where there is no subrogation, and because it calls for additional litigation by way of
subrogation claims where the plaintiff is not overcompensated. '" 43 The General
Assembly has previously modified the collateral source rule for specific types of tort
action. 44 During 1986, at least nine other states abolished or modified the rule.45
Under Sub. H.B. 1,46 most collateral benefits that a tort plaintiff receives prior
to judgment, or is reasonably certain to receive within five years after judgment, are
deducted from the tort judgment if the collateral source has no right of recoupment
through subrogation or the like. The plaintiff receives up to a three-year credit for
costs or premiums previously paid by the plaintiff, his family, or his employer to
secure any collateral benefit which is deducted.
C. Modifying Joint and Several Liability
If tortfeasors A and B are held liable to a plaintiff and if there is no basis to
conclude that A caused one part of the plaintiff's harm and B another, the tortfeasors
have been subject to joint and several or entire liability, which permits the plaintiff
L.ws AN,4. §§ 600.6305-07, 600.6309, 600.6311); N.Y. Ctv. Pc. L. & R. § 5041 (McKinney Supp. 1987); S.D.
CODRED Lkws AN-;. ch. 21-3A (Supp. 1986); \VASI. REv. CODE AN. § 4.56.260 (Supp. 1987).
40. Proposed Omo RE V. CODE § 2323.56.
41. PsrA1mu:Nr (SEco\'D) OF ToRTs § 920A (1977).
42. D. DoBBS, HANBooK oN TmE LAw OF RmiESiEs § 8.10 at 585 (1973).
43. Id. § 3.6 at 186.
44. Omo REv. CODE Ass. §§ 2305.27 (Baldwin 1984) (medical claims), 2743.02()) (Baldwin Supp. 1986)(actions
against the state), 2744.05(B) (Baldwin Supp. 1986) (actions against political subdivisions).
45. AuisAs STAT. § 09.17.070 (Supp. 1986); CoLO. R. STAT. § 13-21-111.6 (Supp. 1986); Act of June 5, 1986,
No. 86-338, §§ 4-6, 1986 Conn. Legis. Serv. No. 5 at 406 (West); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.76 (Supp. 1987); Act of Sept.
26, 1986, No. 84-1431, art. 6, § 1, 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. No. 9, at 284 (West); INM. CODE AaN. §§ 34-4-36-1 through
34-4-36-3 (West Supp. 1986); Act of July 6, 1986, No. 178, § 2591, 1986 Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 4 at 221 (West) (to
be codified at MicH. CoNP. Lws Ar-s. § 600.2591); ,;s. STAT. ANs. § 548.36 (West Supp. 1987); N.Y. Civ. PRAc.
L. & R. § 4545(c) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
46. Proposed Omeo REv. CODE § 2317.45.
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to collect the entire judgment from A or from B.47 If the plaintiff collects the entire
judgment from A, A may, in most states, obtain contribution from B. 48 If, however,
B isimpecunious,A iswithoutrecourse. Joint and several liability thus places the entire
risk that a given co-tortfeasor is insolvent upon any solvent co-tortfeasor(s). 49
Joint and several liability has been criticized as inconsistent with the modem
trend toward comparative responsibility and was modified in a number of states prior
to 1986.50 Indeed, Ohio's 1980 comparative negligence statute51 appears52 (but
apparently was not intended53) to abolish joint and several liability in negligence
actions in which the plaintiff is negligent but is nonetheless permitted to recover a
portion of his or her damages. At least twelve other states modified joint and several
liability during 1986. 54
Under Sub. H.B. 1,5 5 if a plaintiff in a negligence action is contributively
negligent, yet entitled to judgment against two or more tortfeasors, the judgment
imposes several liability only. If the share of any tortfeasor is or becomes
uncollectible, the plaintiff may within one year obtain reallocation of that uncollect-
ible share between or among himself and the other tortfeasor(s). 56 For example, if the
plaintiff is found twenty percent at fault and if defendants A and B are each found
forty percent at fault, the plaintiff is entitled to a several judgment against A for forty
percent of his damages and a several judgment against B for forty percent of his
damages. If A's share is uncollectible, it may be reallocated between the plaintiff and
B on the basis of a twenty to forty ratio, so that the plaintiff cannot collect one-third
of the uncollectible forty percent share of A but is entitled to collect the other
two-thirds of that share from B.
47. RsrAi ,r (SECOND) OF Torts § 433A comment i (1965).
48. See W. PsossER & W. KEroN, THE LAw OF Tom § 50 (5th ed. 1984).
49. "The cutting edge of the 'joint and several' liability rule is that it imposes the risk of a co-tortfeasor's inability
to pay his share on the remaining defendants .... " Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California
Legislature on Tort Liability on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 30
HAst. L.J. 1464, 1483 (1979) (emphasis in original).
50. Granelli, The Attack on Joint and Several Liability, 71 A.B.A. J. 61 (July 1985).
51. OIo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2315.19(A)(2) (Baldwin 1984).
52. Ball, A Reexamination of Joint and Several Liability Under a Comparative Negligence System, 18 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 891, 892 n.5 (1987); V. ScHwARTz, Co.%ivAAvE NGuGuEac § 16.4, at 259 (2d ed. 1986); Granelli, supra note 50,
at 62; Comment, Ohio's Comparative Negligence Statute: The Effect on Joint and Several Liability, Absent Defendants
and Joinder, 50 U. CN. L. R-v. 342, 346 (1981); Brant, A Practitioner's Guide to Comparative Negligence in Ohio, 41
OHIo ST. L.J. 585, 616 (1980).
53. Brant, supra note 52, at 617; Dodge, Ohio's New Comparative Negligence Statute, NEuGmcE LAw NmsLETER
(Ohio St. Bar Ass'n) at 3 (June 20, 1980).
54. ALAsKA STAT. § 09.17.080 (Supp. 1986); CAwF. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (Vest Supp. 1987); CoLO. REv. ST,T. §
13-21-111.5 (Supp. 1986); Act of June 5, 1986, No. 86-338, § 3, 1986 Conn. Legis. Serv. No. 5, at 403 (Vest); FLA.
STAT. AtN. § 768.81 (West Supp. 1987); Act of July 24, 1986, S.B. No. S1-86, § 17 (to be codified at HAw. REv. STAT.
ch. 663); Act of Sept. 26, 1986, No. 84-1431, art. 5, § 1, 1986 Ill. Legis. Serv. No. 9, at 283 (Vest); Act of July 6,
1986, No. 178, § 6304, 1986 Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 4, at 222 (West) (to be codified at MicH. Co.wp. LAws Au,,. §
600.6304); N.Y. Civ. PLAc. L. & R. §§ 1600-01 (McKinney Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-38 (Supp. 1986);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.22.070 (Supp. 1987); Wyo. STAT. § 1-1-109 (Supp. 1986).
55. Proposed amendments to OHIo REv. CODE § 2315.19 (Baldwin 1984).
56. This reallocation provision is similar to one in the UsNross Co.NiPAranivE FAULT Act § 2(d), 12 U.L.A. (Supp.
1987 at 42).
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HI. MODIFYING THE RULES GOVERNING PuNrtivE DAMAGES AwARDs
IN TORT ACTIONS
In instances of aggravated tortious misconduct, punitive damages may be
assessed against a defendant. Such damages are generally not said to compensate the
plaintiff for harm suffered, but to punish the defendant and to deter the defendant and
others from engaging in similar misconduct.57 In determining the amount of a
punitive damages award, it is proper for the trier of fact to consider the nature of the
defendant's conduct, the degree of harm suffered by the plaintiff, and the financial
resources of the defendant. 58
Current rules governing punitive damages have been criticized, largely on the
ground that they do not sufficiently reflect the quasi-criminal nature of such awards.
One commentator, for example, has argued that the protections of the fourth, fifth,
and sixth amendments should apply to defendants from whom punitive damages are
sought.59 It is also alleged that the evidence of a defendant's financial resources
typically adduced in support of a punitive damages claim tends unfairly to influence
the size of any compensatory award. 60 During 1986, at least nine other states made
changes in punitive damages law in response to such criticisms. 61
Substitute H.B. 162 provides that, unless another section of the Revised Code
requires otherwise, a plaintiff seeking punitive damages in a tort action must adduce
proof of actual damages and must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the
conduct of the defendant demonstrated "malice, aggravated or egregious fraud,
oppression, or insult." In addition, though the trier of fact determines whether or not
an award of punitive damages is to be made in a tort action, the judge, unless another
section of the Revised Code provides otherwise, determines the amount of any such
award. 63 Finally, awards of punitive damages are made uninsurable by an insurance
provision of Sub. H.B. 1.64
IV. CODIFYING THE LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY
It has been argued at least since the mid-1970's that the rules governing the
liability of commercial suppliers of products have become too pro-plaintiff and too
uncertain. 65 It has been suggested that the controlling rules, notably those imposing
strict liability in tort for defective products under Restatement (Second) of Torts
57. REsrATEmENT (SEcoND) OF ToRs § 908 (1977).
58. Id. comment e.
59. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REy. 269 (1983).
60. ArucAN BAR Ass'N, REP'T or THE Acnox CO.'N To LmpRovE m  ToR Ltaxmry Sysrp's 17 (1987).
61. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020 (Supp. 1986); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
768.72-,73 (,Vest Supp. 1987); Act of Sept. 26, 1986, No. 84-1431, art. 3, § 1, 1986 I11. Legis. Serv. No. 9, at 282
(West); Act of May 22, 1986, § 42, 1986 Iowa Legis. Serv. No. 8, at 35 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE § 668A. 1);
Me-. STAT. ANN. § 549.191 (West Supp. 1987); N.H. Ra,. STAT. AN-4. § 507:16 (Supp. 1986); Act of June 24, 1986, ch.
315, § 1, 1986 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 1524 (West) (amending 23 OKLA. STAT. § 9); S.D. CoDnrmo LAws ANN. § 21-1-4.1
(Supp. 1986).
62. Proposed Otao REv. CODE § 2315.21; proposed amendments to OHIo REv. CODE Am. § 2315.18 (Baldwin 1984).
63. In the opinion of the author, this provision of Sus. H.B. I may well violate the right of jury trial guaranteed
by art. I, § 5 of the Ohio Constitution.
64. Proposed Omo Rv. CODE § 3937.182.
65. See, e.g., California Citizens Comm'n on Tort Reform, Righting the Liability Balance 75-81 (1977).
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§ 402A and its variants, have resulted in unfairness to defendants and have made it
difficult for suppliers to obtain affordable liability insurance or to adequately
self-insure for product-related injuries.66 In 1979, the United States Department of
Commerce promulgated a Model Uniform Product Liability Act for consideration and
adoption by individual states. 67 In almost every session of Congress during this
decade, efforts have been made, to date without success, to obtain federal
codification of the law of product liability. 68
Not including statutes extending comparative fault to strict product liability
actions or the almost universal statutes granting some form of immunity to suppliers
of blood and blood products, 69 a majority of states have adopted statutes specifically
limiting product liability. 70 In 1984, the General Assembly granted immunity from
strict tort liability to product suppliers other than manufacturers under specified
circumstances. 71
Substitute H.B. 235 codifies the basic rules governing product liability claims
for death, physical injury to person, emotional distress, or physical damage to
property other than the product in question. With the exception of specified "toxic
tort" situations, pre-existing state statutory and common law theories of liability are
superseded unless recognized by the statutory framework. 72
Four types of product defects subject a manufacturer to liability under Sub. H.B.
235: defects due to (1) manufacture or construction; 73 (2) design or formulation; 74
(3) inadequate warning or instruction; 75 and (4) failure to conform to a representation
concerning product safety or quality.76 A commercial supplier other than a manu-
facturer is subject to liability for its negligence and for its representations concerning
product safety or quality. Such a supplier (e.g., a retailer or wholesaler) is also
subject to the strict liability of a manufacturer in specified circumstances adapted
from present Ohio Revised Code § 2305.33, the 1984 immunity statute. 77
The effect of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk on strict product
liability claims is also codified. Contributory negligence is no defense, while
assumption of the risk is a total bar to recovery. 78
66. UNrED STATEs DEP'T OF CoMMERCE, INTERAGENcy TASK FoRcE ox PRODUCr Ltamn.rr, FwA. REPORT 1-26 to 1-29
(1977).
67. 44 FED. REo. 62,714 (Oct. 31, 1979).
68. In the 99th Congress, S. 2760, a product liability bill, was reported by the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation. 132 CONG. REC. S 11,742 (daily ed. Aug. 14, 1986). The Senate voted 84-13 to proceed with
floor consideration of the bill, id., at S13,709-10, but the Majority Leader later "yanked the measure from the floor
because Ernest F. Hollings, D-SC, was prepared to filibuster to prevent a vote on the legislation." CONG. QuAR. WE.KLY
REP'T 2,316 (Sept. 27, 1986).
69. E.g., Omio REv. CODE ANN. § 2108.11 (Baldwin 1978).
70. One product liability looseleaf service lists such statutes for some twenty-nine states. 2 PROD. LIa. REP. (CCH)
H 90,170-95,270.
71. Onwo REv. CoDne AN. § 2305.33 (Baldwin 1984).
72. Proposed Oino REv. CODE 99 2307.72-.73.
73. Id. § 2307.74.
74. Id. § 2307.75.
75. Id. § 2307.76.
76. Id. § 2307.77.
77. Id. § 2307.78.
78. Id. § 2315.20.
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Finally, a standard for recovery of punitive damages in connection with a
product liability claim ("flagrant disregard" of consumer safety) is codified under
Sub. H.B. 235. 79 As with tort punitive damages claims generally under Sub. H.B. 1,
the court determines the amount of any punitive damages product liability award,
using criteria specified in Sub. H.B. 235.
V. ATEMPTING TO INFLUENCE THE CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS
A. Discouraging Litigation Misconduct
Noted scholars and leaders among the bench and bar have identified the
discouragement of frivolous assertion of claims or defenses and other misconduct of
attorneys and parties as a pressing need of the civil justice system. A vast literature
has developed as the need has been addressed by legislators, courts, and blue-ribbon
committees nationwide. 80 In 1983, for example, Rules 11 and 26 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were amended in an attempt to deter frivolous conduct.8 1 In 1984,
a distinguished American Bar Association committee chaired by former Attorney
General Griffin B. Bell concluded that
candor requires our judgment that a small percentage of cases brought to court are not, by
objective standards, of arguable merit. At the same time, we note, the problem exists of
defense tactics which impose wasteful discovery costs and prolong litigation unnecessarily.
These are facts well known to practitioners and judges alike.5 2
During 1986, at least fifteen other states adopted measures designed to deter
misconduct in civil litigation.8 3
Under Sub. H.B. 1,84 an attorney or party in a civil action may be sanctioned on
motion of a party for engaging in frivolous conduct, defined in language borrowed
from the Code of Professional Responsibility8 5 as conduct which either (1) obviously
serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party or (2) is not warranted
79. Id. § 2307.80.
80. See, e.g., Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 EAv. L. REV. 630
(1987); Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the Struggle between
Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313 (1986); Parness, Groundless Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys in the
Federal Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REv. 325; Partridge, Wilkinson, and Krouse, A Complaint Based on Rumors: Countering
Frivolous Litigation, 31 Loy. L. REv. 221 (1985).
81. 90 F.R.D. 451, 462-66, 478-84 (1981).
82. American Bar Ass'n, Towards a Jurisprudence of Injury: The Continuing Creation of a System of Substantive
Justice in American Tort Law (REP'T or TE SPEcIAL COM''N o-4 nm Tozr Li1ensrv Sys'm), at 13-7 (1984). "'For the long
term, a major challenge to our adversary system is to emphasize to and convince lawyers of their professional
responsibility to avoid dilatory and obfuscatory tactics." Id. at 13-5.
83. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-349 (Supp. 1986); Act of June 5, 1986, No. 86-338, §§ 8-9, 1986 Conn. Legis.
Serv. No. 5, at 408 (West); GA. CoDE AN's. § 9-15-14 (Supp. 1986); Act of July 24, 1986, S.B. No. SI-86, § 13
(amending HAw. REv. STAT. § 607-14.5); Act of Sept. 26, 1986, No. 84-1431, art. 2, § 1, 1986 I1. Legis. Serv. No. 9,
at 281 (West); IND. CoE ArNm. § 34-1-32-1 (West Supp. 1986); Act of May 22, 1986, §§ 36, 38, 1986 Iowa Legis. Serv.
No. 8, at 32, 33 (West) (to be codified at IOWA CODE §§ 617.16, 619.19); KAN. STAT. Ar. § 60-211 (Supp. 1986); Act
of July 6, 1986, No. 178, § 2591, 1986 Mich. Legis. Serv. No. 4, at 211 (West) (to be codified at Mien. CoM. L.Aws Ar.
§ 600.2591); Mrs's. STAT. Ar,. § 549.21 (West Supp. 1987); N.H. Rev. STAT. Am. § 507:15 (Supp. 1986); N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. § 8303-a (MeKinney Supp. 1987); N.C. GrN. STAT. § IA-I (Supp. 1986) (amending Rule 11, N.C.R. Civ.
P.); Act of June 24, 1986, ch. 315, § 3, 1986 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 1525 (West); Wyo. STAT. § 1-14-128 (Supp. 1986).
84. Proposed Omo REv. CODE § 2323.51.
85. CODE OF PsornSO-AL REsonsn.ny DR 7-102(A)(1)-(2), 23 Ohio St. 2d 1, 46 (1970).
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under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. The sanction may not exceed the
attorney's fees both reasonably incurred by another party and necessitated by the
frivolous conduct in question.
B. Encouraging Settlement of Meritorious Tort Claims
A second need of the civil justice system which has generated nearly as much
concern as discouraging frivolous claims, defenses, and conduct is that of encour-
aging prompt settlement of meritorious civil actions. 86 Since over ninety percent of
civil actions are disposed of without trial, any mechanism which is fair and which
encourages more prompt settlement promises worthwhile savings of time and money
for all concerned-the litigants, the judicial system, and the public. 87 During 1986,
at least two other states adopted measures designed to encourage prompt settlement
of tort claims. 88
Under Sub. H.B. 1,89 on motion of a party, the court may, 120 to 14 days before
trial, order a plaintiff and defendant in a tort action to serve and file written offers of
settlement. If the offers are equal or overlap, the court enters judgment for the amount
obtained by averaging the offers.
If the action goes to trial and judgment, the court may consider awarding
reasonable attorney's fees as follows: to the plaintiff, if the judgment is for the
plaintiff and if it exceeds the plaintiff's written "offer" by twenty-five percent or
more; to the defendant if the judgment is for the defendant or if it is for the plaintiff
and does not exceed seventy-five percent of the defendant's written offer. The court
must hold a hearing and consider specified statutory criteria before shifting attorney's
fees from one party to another.
An award of attorney's fees to a plaintiff may not exceed the lesser of attorney's
fees reasonably incurred or twenty-five percent of the judgment. An award to a
defendant may not exceed the lesser of attorney's fees reasonably incurred or the
difference between the written offers of the parties. If, however, the plaintiff has
judgment and attorney's fees are awarded to the defendant, the fees awarded may not
exceed the amount of the plaintiff's judgment.
C. Regulating the Contingent Fee
The traditional agreement between a tort plaintiff and his or her attorney has
called for a contingent fee whereby the attorney receives a specified percentage of any
86. American Bar Ass'n, supra note 82, at 13-8. Compare the efforts to amend Rule 68, FED. R. Civ. P., 98 F.R.D.
337, 361-67 (1983) and 102 F.R.D. 407, 432-37 (1984), and the commentary on those efforts, e.g., Burbank, Proposals
to Amend Rule 68--Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 425 (1986); Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 Gm.
VAH. L. Rv. 1 (1985).
87. "The law encourages settlement not as an end abstractly desirable in itself, but in recognition of the fact that
there are often savings all around-for litigants and for the public treasury-when parties make private arrangements that
remove cases from the courts." American Bar Ass'n, supra note 82, at 4-209. For a trenchant critique of the supposed
benefits of settlement, see Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Ymx L.J. 1073 (1984).
88. At.AsA STAT. § 09.30.065 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. Ar. § 768.79 (West Supp. 1987).
89. Proposed Oto REv. CODE § 2307.02.
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judgment or settlement obtained and nothing in the event that no recovery is had. The
contingent fee has been ardently supported as permitting persons of limited means to
gain access to the courts and as discouraging assertion of nonmeritorious claims. 9o It
has been equally ardently criticized of late as excessive and unjustified in certain
cases. 9 1 During 1986, at least four other states enacted measures regulating attorney's
fees in tort actions. 92
Under Sub. H.B. 1,93 a contingent fee agreement respecting a tort claim must be
reduced to writing and signed by the attorney and the client. The attorney must
provide the client with a copy of the signed writing. If an attorney becomes entitled
to a contingent fee respecting a tort claim, the attorney must provide the client with
a signed closing statement at the time of, or prior to, receipt of compensation under
the contingent fee agreement. The statement must specify the manner in which the fee
was determined, any costs and expenses deducted, and any proposed division of
attorney's fees, costs, and expenses with referring or associated counsel.
A temporary law provision of Sub. H.B. 194 requests the Ohio Supreme Court
to adopt a Rule for the Government of the Bar which would set forth a maximum
permissible schedule for contingent fees in tort actions.
D. Precluding Specification in the Original Complaint of a Dollar Amount in
Larger Tort Cases
Some observers believe that public perceptions of the tort system have played an
important role in creating pressure for changes in tort and civil justice law.95 Those
perceptions, it is said, have been unduly influenced by media reports of the filing of
tort actions seeking seven-figure damages awards or awards seemingly out of
proportion to the injuries alleged to have been sustained. 96 During 1986, at least two
90. Shrager, The Hammerfor the Public Interest, 71 A.B.A. J. 38 (Dec. 1985); S. SrrzsE, LAwsurr 591-95 (1980).
91. Dubois, Modify the Contingent Fee System, 71 A.B.A. J. 38 (Dec. 1985). The American Bar Association has
recently approved recommendations that courts should (1) "prohibit the practice of taking a percentage fee out of the gross
amount of any judgment or settlement" and (2) "have the authority to disallow, after a hearing, any portion of a fee found
to be 'plainly excessive' in light of prevailing rates and practices." American Bar Ass'n, supra note 60, at iii.
92. Act of June 5, 1986, No. 86-338, § 1, 1986 Conn. Legis. Serv. No. 5, at 399 (vest); Act of July 24, 1986,
S.B. No. S 1-86, § 11 (to be codified at HAw. R~v. STAT. ch. 607); N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-e (Supp. 1986); WASH.
Rv. CODE Arw. § 4.24.005 (Supp. 1987).
93. Proposed Omuo Rsv. CoDE § 4705.15.
94. SuB. H.B. 1, 117th Ohio General Assembly § 4.
95. At a recent Congressional hearing, a United States Senator acknowledged the role of public perceptions of the
tort system:
As you know, I, for one, have long concluded that our tort liability system has broken down, and that it is the
responsibility of the Congress to make suitable repairs.
I am certainly not alone in that judgment. Indeed, the American people, as a whole, have reached the very same
conclusion.
According to a recent Lou Harris survey, and I quote: "The American people favor radical changes in the laws
governing liability suits." Two-thirds of those surveyed believe that it is too easy to sue for damages.
Two-thirds believe that the size of cash settlements is too excessive, and that maximum awards, other than
medical benefits, ought to be capped at $150,000. Now that is the American people talking there in that survey.
Product Liability Reform Act: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary on S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. 73 (1986) (testimony of Hon. Mitch McConnell).
96. Compare this observation of the President of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America:
[W]e lawyers share some of the blame with the media for the perception in America that this is a runaway,
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other states enacted statutes limiting specification of a dollar amount of requested
damages in certain tort actions. 97
Under Sub. H.B. 1,98 a tort complaint in an Ohio Court of Common Pleas is to
include a demand for judgment but is not to initially specify the amount of damages
sought if the plaintiff seeks more than $25,000. At any time twenty-eight days or
more after the complaint is filed, a defendant may request a written statement that
specifies the amount of damages sought. The plaintiff must in any event amend the
complaint to specify the amount of damages sought no later than seven days before
applying for a default judgment or before the scheduled date of trial. 99
litigious society, with juries running amok, for my members and myself have been quick in recent years to see
that the successes that we have had were publicized when in fact the losses and less modest results were not.
Id. at 300 (testimony of Robert J. Habush).
97. Act of May 22, 1986, § 37, 1986 Iowa Legis. Serv. No. 8, at 32 (West) (amending IOWA CODE § 619.18); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § IA-I (Supp. 1986) (amending Rule 8, N.C. R. Civ. P.).
98. Proposed Oo Rsv. Coos § 2309.01.
99. Cf. Oino R. Civ. P. 54(C) (money judgment generally limited to sum claimed in demand unless claimant
amends not later than seven days before commencement of trial).
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